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Abstract
Bytecode veriﬁcation is a crucial security component for Java applets, on the Web and on
embedded devices such as smart cards. This paper reviews the various bytecode veriﬁcation
algorithms that have been proposed, recasts them in a common framework of dataﬂow analysis,
and surveys the use of proof assistants to specify bytecode veriﬁcation and prove its correctness.
1 Introduction
Web applets have popularized the idea of downloading and executing untrusted compiled code on
the personal computer running the Web browser, without user’s approval or intervention. Obvi-
ously, this raises major security issues: without appropriate security measures, a malicious applet
could mount a variety of attacks against the local computer, such as destroying data (e.g. refor-
matting the disk), modifying sensitive data (e.g. registering a bank transfer via a home-banking
software [5]), divulging personal information over the network, or modifying other programs (Trojan
attacks).
Beyond Web services, the applet model is now being transferred to high-security embedded
devices such as smart cards: the Java Card architecture [6] allows for post-issuance downloading of
applets on smart cards. Smart cards are used as security tokens in sensitive application areas such
as payment, mobile telephony, and authentication. This makes the security issues with applets
even more acute.
The solution put forward by the Java programming environment is to execute the applets in a
so-called “sandbox”, which is an insulation layer preventing direct access to the hardware resources
and implementing a suitable access control policy [18, 54, 34]. The security of the sandbox model
relies on the following three components:
1. Applets are not compiled down to machine executable code, but rather to bytecode for a
virtual machine. The virtual machine manipulates higher-level, more secure abstractions of
data than the hardware processor, such as object references instead of memory addresses.
2. Applets are not given direct access to hardware resources such as the serial port, but only
to a carefully designed set of API classes and methods that perform suitable access control
before performing interactions with the outside world on behalf of the applet.
13. Upon downloading, the bytecode of the applet is subject to a static analysis called bytecode
veriﬁcation, whose purpose is to make sure that the code of the applet is well typed and
does not attempt to bypass protections 1 and 2 above by performing ill-typed operations at
run-time, such as forging object references from integers, illegal casting of an object reference
from one class to another, calling directly private methods of the API, jumping in the middle
of an API method, or jumping to data as if it were code [19, 58, 33].
Thus, bytecode veriﬁcation is a crucial security component in the Java “sandbox” model: any bug
in the veriﬁer causing an ill-typed applet to be accepted can potentially enable a security attack.
At the same time, bytecode veriﬁcation is a complex process involving elaborate program analyses.
Consequently, considerable research eﬀorts have been expended to specify the goals of bytecode
veriﬁcation, formalize bytecode veriﬁcation algorithms, and prove their correctness.
The purpose of the present paper is to survey this work on bytecode veriﬁcation. We explain
what bytecode veriﬁcation is, describe the various algorithms that have been proposed, outline the
main problems they are faced with, and give references to machine-assisted proofs of correctness.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a quick overview of the Java
virtual machine and of bytecode veriﬁcation. Section 3 presents the basic bytecode veriﬁcation al-
gorithm based on dataﬂow analysis. Sections 4 and 5 concentrate on two delicate veriﬁcation issues:
checking object initialization and dealing with JVM subroutines. Section 6 presents polyvariant
veriﬁcation algorithms that address the subroutine issue. Some issues speciﬁc to low-resources
embedded systems are discussed in section 7, followed by conclusions and perspectives in section 8.
2 Overview of the JVM and of bytecode veriﬁcation
The Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [33] is a conventional stack-based abstract machine. Most in-
structions pop their arguments oﬀ the stack, and push back their results on the stack. In addition, a
set of registers (also called local variables) is provided; they can be accessed via “load” and “store”
instructions that push the value of a given register on the stack or store the top of the stack in the
given register, respectively. While the architecture does not mandate it, most Java compilers use
registers to store the values of source-level local variables and method parameters, and the stack
to hold temporary results during evaluation of expressions. Both the stack and the registers are
part of the activation record for a method. Thus, they are preserved across method calls. The
entry point for a method speciﬁes the number of registers and stack slots used by the method, thus
allowing an activation record of the right size to be allocated on method entry.
Control is handled by a variety of intra-method branch instructions: unconditional branch
(“goto”), conditional branches (“branch if top of stack is 0”), multi-way branches (corresponding
to the switch Java construct). Exception handlers can be speciﬁed as a table of (pc1;pc2;C;h)
quadruples, meaning that if an exception of class C or a subclass of C is raised by any instruction
between locations pc1 and pc2, control is transferred to the instruction at h (the exception handler).
About 200 instructions are supported, including arithmetic operations, comparisons, object
creation, ﬁeld accesses and method invocations. The example in Figure 1 should give the general
ﬂavor of JVM bytecode.
An important feature of the JVM is that most instructions are typed. For instance, the iadd
instruction (integer addition) requires that the stack initially contains at least two elements, and
that these two elements are of type int; it then pushes back a result of type int. Similarly, a
2Source Java code:
static int factorial(int n)
{
int res;
for (res = 1; n > 0; n--) res = res * n;
return res;
}
Corresponding JVM bytecode:
method static int factorial(int), 2 registers, 2 stack slots
0: iconst_1 // push the integer constant 1
1: istore_1 // store it in register 1 (the res variable)
2: iload_0 // push register 0 (the n parameter)
3: ifle 14 // if negative or null, go to PC 14
6: iload_1 // push register 1 (res)
7: iload_0 // push register 0 (n)
8: imul // multiply the two integers at top of stack
9: istore_1 // pop result and store it in register 1
10: iinc 0, -1 // decrement register 0 (n) by 1
11: goto 2 // go to PC 2
14: iload_1 // load register 1 (res)
15: ireturn // return its value to caller
Figure 1: An example of JVM bytecode
3getfield C:f:¿ instruction (access the instance ﬁeld f of type ¿ declared in class C) requires that
the top of the stack contains a reference to an instance of class C or one of its sub-classes (and
not, for instance, an integer – this would correspond to an attempt to forge an object reference
by an unsafe cast); it then pops it and pushes back a value of type ¿ (the value of the ﬁeld f).
More generally, proper operation of the JVM is not guaranteed unless the code meets at least the
following conditions:
² Type correctness: the arguments of an instruction are always of the types expected by the
instruction.
² No stack overﬂow or underﬂow: an instruction never pops an argument oﬀ an empty stack,
nor pushes a result on a full stack (whose size is equal to the maximal stack size declared for
the method).
² Code containment: the program counter must always point within the code for the method,
to the beginning of a valid instruction encoding (no falling oﬀ the end of the method code;
no branches into the middle of an instruction encoding).
² Register initialization: a load from a register must always follow at least one store in this
register; in other terms, registers that do not correspond to method parameters are not
initialized on method entrance, and it is an error to load from an uninitialized register.
² Object initialization: when an instance of a class C is created, one of the initialization methods
for class C (corresponding to the constructors for this class) must be invoked before the class
instance can be used.
One way to guarantee these conditions is to check them dynamically, while executing the byte-
code. This is called the “defensive JVM approach” in the literature [11]. However, checking these
conditions at run-time is expensive and slows down execution signiﬁcantly. The purpose of byte-
code veriﬁcation is to check these conditions once and for all, by static analysis of the bytecode at
loading-time. Bytecode that passes veriﬁcation can then be executed faster, omitting the dynamic
checks for the conditions above.
It must be emphasized that bytecode veriﬁcation by itself does not guarantee secure execution
of the code: many crucial properties of the code still need to be checked dynamically, for instance
via array bounds checks and null pointer checks in the virtual machine, and access control checks in
the API. The purpose of bytecode veriﬁcation is to shift the veriﬁcations listed above from run-time
to loading-time.
3 Basic veriﬁcation by dataﬂow analysis
The ﬁrst JVM bytecode veriﬁcation algorithm is due to Gosling and Yellin at Sun [19, 58, 33].
Almost all existing bytecode veriﬁers implement this algorithm. It can be summarized as a dataﬂow
analysis applied to a type-level abstract interpretation of the virtual machine. Some advanced
aspects of the algorithm that go beyond standard dataﬂow analysis are described in sections 4
and 5. In this section, we describe the basic ingredients of this algorithm: the type-level abstract
interpreter and the dataﬂow framework.
4iconst n : (S; R) ! (int:S; R) if jSj < Mstack
ineg : (int:S; R) ! (int:S; R)
iadd : (int:int:S; R) ! (int:S; R)
iload n : (S; R) ! (int:S; R)
if 0 · n < Mreg and R(n) = int and jSj < Mstack
istore n : (int:S; R) ! (S; Rfn Ã intg) if 0 · n < Mreg
aconst null : (S; R) ! (null:S; R) if jSj < Mstack
aload n : (S; R) ! (R(n):S; R)
if 0 · n < Mreg and R(n) <: Object and jSj < Mstack
astore n : (¿:S; R) ! (S; Rfn Ã ¿g)
if 0 · n < Mreg and ¿ <: Object
getfield C:f:¿ : (¿0:S; R) ! (¿:S; R) if ¿0 <: C
putfield C:f:¿ : (¿1:¿2:S; R) ! (S; R) if ¿1 <: ¿ and ¿2 <: C
invokestatic C:m:¾ : (¿0
n :::¿0
1:S; R) ! (¿:S; R)
if ¾ = ¿(¿1;:::;¿n), ¿0
i <: ¿i for i = 1:::n, and j¿:Sj · Mstack
invokevirtual C:m:¾ : (¿0
n :::¿0
1:¿0:S; R) ! (¿:S; R)
if ¾ = ¿(¿1;:::;¿n), ¿0 <: C, ¿0
i <: ¿i for i = 1:::n, j¿:Sj · Mstack
Figure 2: Selected rules for the type-level abstract interpreter. Mstack is the maximal stack size
and Mreg the maximal number of registers.
3.1 The type-level abstract interpreter
At the heart of all bytecode veriﬁcation algorithms described in this paper is an abstract interpreter
for the JVM instruction set that executes JVM instructions like a defensive JVM (including type
tests, stack underﬂow and overﬂow tests, etc), but operates over types instead of values. That is,
the abstract interpreter manipulates a stack of types (a sequence of types) and a register type (a
tuple of types associating a type to each register number). It simulates the execution of instructions
at the level of types. For instance, for the iadd instruction (integer addition), it checks that the
stack of types contains at least two elements, and that the top two elements are the type int. It
then pops the top two elements and pushes back the type int corresponding to the result of the
addition.
Figure 2 deﬁnes more formally the abstract interpreter on a number of representative JVM
instructions. The abstract interpreter is presented as a transition relation i : (S;R) ! (S0;R0),
where i is the instruction, S and R the stack type and register type before executing the instruction,
and S0 and R0 the stack type and register type after executing the instruction. Errors such as type
mismatches on the arguments, stack underﬂow, or stack overﬂow, are denoted by the absence of a
transition. For instance, there is no transition on iadd from an empty stack.
Notice that method invocations (such as the invokestatic and invokevirtual instructions in
Figure 2) are not treated by branching to the code of the invoked method, like the concrete JVM
does, but simply assume that the eﬀect of the method invocation on the stack is as described by the
method signature given in the “invoke” instruction. All bytecode veriﬁcation algorithms described
in this paper proceed method per method, assuming that all other methods are well-typed when
verifying the code of a method. A simple coinductive argument shows that if this is the case, the
5>
Object int float
C
D E
Object[]
C[]
D[] E[]
int[] float[] Object[][]
C[][]
D[][] E[][]
null
Figure 3: Some type expressions used by the veriﬁer, with their subtyping relation. C, D, E are
user-deﬁned classes, with D and E extending C. Not all types are shown.
program as a whole (the collection of all methods) is well typed.
The types manipulated by the abstract interpreter are similar to the source-level types of the
Java language. They include primitive types (int, long, float, double), array types, and object
reference types represented by the fully qualiﬁed names of the corresponding classes. The boolean,
byte, short and char types of Java are identiﬁed with int. Three extra types are introduced: null
to represent the type of the null reference, ? to represent the absence of any value (at unreachable
instructions), and > to represent the contents of uninitialized registers, that is, any value. (“Load”
instructions explicitly check that the accessed register does not have type >, thus detecting accesses
to uninitialized registers.)
These types are equipped with a subtyping relation, written <:, which is essentially identical to
the subtyping relation of the Java language (the “assignment compatibility” predicate). Figure 3
illustrates the subtyping relation. Precise deﬁnitions of <: can be found in [46, 38, 29, 27], but
are omitted here. For the purposes of this article, all we require from the subtyping relation is the
following property:
Property 1 (Well-founded semi-lattice.) The set of types ordered by the <: relation is a semi-
lattice: any pair of types has a least upper bound. Moreover, the <: ordering is well founded: there
does not exist inﬁnite strictly increasing sequences of types.
The <: relation between types is extended pointwise to register types and stack types. Two
stack types are in the <: relation only if they have the same size. It is easy to see that the <:
relation on register types and on stack types is well founded.
The type-level abstract interpreter must satisfy several formal properties. First and foremost is
correctness with respect to the dynamic semantics of the defensive JVM: if the abstract interpreter
can do a transition i : (S;R) ! (S0;R0), then for all concrete states (s;r) matching (S;R), the
defensive JVM, started in state (s;r), will not stop on a run-time type violation: it will either loop
or transition to a state (s0;r0) that matches (S0;R0). This correctness property was formalized and
proved by several authors, including Pusch [43] (using the Isabelle/HOL prover), Coglio et al [10]
(using SpecWare), Goldberg [17] and Qian [44] (using standard mathematics).
6r0 : C = lub(D;E)
r0 : D r0 : E
Figure 4: Handling joins in the control ﬂow
Two other properties of the abstract interpreter are essential to ensure correctness and termi-
nation of the bytecode veriﬁcation algorithms reviewed in this paper: determinacy of transitions,
and monotonicity with respect to the subtyping relation.
Property 2 (Determinacy.) The transitions of the abstract interpreter deﬁne a partial function:
if i : (S;R) ! (S1;R1) and i : (S;R) ! (S2;R2), then S1 = S2 and R1 = R2.
Property 3 (Monotonicity.) If i : (S;R) ! (S0;R0), then for all stack types S1 <: S and register
types R1 <: R, there exists a stack type S0
1 and a register type R0
1 such that i : (S1;R1) ! (S0
1;R0
1),
and moreover S0
1 <: S0 and R0
1 <: R.
3.2 The dataﬂow analysis
Verifying a method whose body is a straight-line piece of code (no branches) is easy: we simply
iterate the transition function of the abstract interpreter over the instructions, taking the stack type
and register type “after” the preceding instruction as the stack type and register type “before” the
next instruction. The initial stack and register types reﬂect the state of the JVM on method
entrance: the stack type is empty; the types of the registers 0:::n ¡ 1 corresponding to the n
method parameters are set to the types of the corresponding parameters in the method signature;
the other registers n:::Mreg ¡ 1 corresponding to uninitialized local variables are given the type
>.
If the abstract interpreter gets “stuck”, i.e. cannot make a transition from one of the intermediate
states, then veriﬁcation fails and the code is rejected. Otherwise, veriﬁcation succeeds, and since the
abstract interpreter is a correct approximation of a defensive JVM, we are certain that a defensive
JVM will not get stuck either executing the code. Thus, the code is correct and can be executed
safely by a regular, non-defensive JVM.
Branches and exception handlers introduce forks and joins in the control ﬂow of the method.
Thus, an instruction can have several predecessors, with diﬀerent stack and register types “after”
these predecessor instructions. Sun’s bytecode veriﬁer deals with this situation in the manner
customary for data ﬂow analysis: the state (stack type and register type) “before” an instruction
is taken to be the least upper bound of the states “after” all predecessors of this instruction. For
instance, assume classes D and E extend C, and we analyze a conditional construct that stores a
value of type D in register 0 in one arm, and a value of type E in the other arm. (See Figure 4.)
When the two arms meet, register 0 is assumed to have type C, which is the least upper bound
(the smallest common supertype) of D and E.
More precisely, write instr(p) for the instruction at program point p, in(p) for the state “before”
the instruction at p, and out(p) for the state “after” the instruction at p. The veriﬁcation algorithm
7sets up the following forward dataﬂow equations:
instr(p) : in(p) ! out(p)
in(p) = lubfout(q) j q predecessor of pg
for every valid program point p, plus
in(0) = (";(P0;:::;Pn¡1;>;:::;>))
for the entry point (the Pk are the types of the method parameters). These equations are then
solved by standard ﬁxpoint iteration using Kildall’s worklist algorithm [35, section 8.4]: a program
point p is taken from the worklist and its state “after” out(p) is determined from its state “before”
in(p) using the abstract interpreter; then, we replace in(q) by lub(in(q);out(p)) for each successor
q of p, and enter those successors q for which in(q) changed in the worklist. The ﬁxpoint is reached
when the worklist is empty, in which case veriﬁcation succeeds. Veriﬁcation fails if a state with no
transition is encountered, or one of the least upper bounds is undeﬁned.
As a trivial optimization of the algorithm above, the dataﬂow equations can be set up at the
level of extended basic blocks rather than individual instructions. In other terms, it suﬃces to keep
in working memory the states in(p) where p is the beginning of an extended basic block (i.e. a
branch target); the other states can be recomputed on the ﬂy as needed.
The least upper bound of two states is taken pointwise, both on the stack types and the register
types. It is undeﬁned if the stack types have diﬀerent heights, which causes veriﬁcation to fail.
This situation corresponds to a program point where the run-time stack can have diﬀerent heights
depending on the path by which the point is reached; such code cannot be proved correct in
the framework described in this section, and must be rejected. (See section 6.2 for an alternate
veriﬁcation algorithm that can handle this situation.)
The least upper bound of two types for a register (or stack slot) can be >, causing this register
to have type > in the merged state. This corresponds to the situation where a register holds values
of incompatible types in two arms of a conditional (e.g. int in one arm and an object reference in
the other), and therefore is treated as uninitialized (no further loads from this register) after the
merge point.
Several formalizations and proofs (on paper or on machine) of the bytecode veriﬁcation al-
gorithm described above have been published. Nipkow and Klein’s development in Isabell/HOL
[38, 29, 27] is the closest to the dataﬂow presentation that we gave above. Other formalizations
and correctness proofs of the dataﬂow approach include those of Qian [44], Coglio et al [10], and
St¨ ark et al [49]. Bytecode veriﬁcation can also be speciﬁed and proved sound using type systems
[51, 14, 13]; in this framework, the forward dataﬂow analysis algorithm that we described can be
viewed as a type inference algorithm for these type systems. Hartel and Moreau [21] survey other
approaches.
3.3 Interfaces and least upper bounds
The dataﬂow framework presented above requires that the type algebra, ordered by the subtyping
relation, constitutes a semi-lattice. That is, every pair of types possesses a smallest common
supertype (least upper bound).
Unfortunately, this property does not hold if we take the veriﬁer type algebra to be the Java
source-level type algebra (extended with > and null) and the subtyping relation to be the Java
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classes, and a class can implement several interfaces. Consider the following classes:
interface I { ... }
interface J { ... }
class C1 implements I, J { ... }
class C2 implements I, J { ... }
The subtyping relation induced by these declarations is:
Object
I J
C1 C2
This is obviously not a semi-lattice, since the two types C1 and C2 have two common super-types
I and J that are not comparable (neither is subtype of the other).
There are several ways to address this issue. One approach is to manipulate sets of types during
veriﬁcation instead of single types as we described earlier. These sets of types are to be interpreted
as conjunctive types, i.e. the set fI;Jg, like the conjunctive type I^J, represents values that have
both types I and J, and therefore is a suitable least upper bound for the types fC1g and fC2g in
the example above. This is the approach followed in [17, 44, 43, 49].
Another approach is to complete the class and interface hierarchy of the program into a lattice
before performing veriﬁcation [30]. This is an instance of a general mathematical construction
known as the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of a poset. In the example above, the completion
would add a point IandJ to the lattice of types, which is a subtype of both I and J, and a supertype
of C1 and C2. We then obtain the following semi-lattice:
Object
I J
IandJ
C1 C2
The additional type IandJ plays the same role as the type set fI;Jg in the ﬁrst approach
described above. The diﬀerence is that the completion of the class/interface hierarchy is performed
once and for all, and veriﬁcation manipulates only simple types rather than sets of types. This
keeps veriﬁcation simple and fast.
The simplest solution to the interface problem is to be found in Sun’s implementation of the
JDK bytecode veriﬁer. (This approach is documented nowhere, but can easily be inferred by
experimentation.) Namely, bytecode veriﬁcation ignores interfaces, treating all interface types as
the class type Object. Thus, the type algebra used by the veriﬁer contains only proper classes
and no interfaces, and subtyping between proper classes is simply the inheritance relation between
them. Since Java has single inheritance (a class can implement several interfaces, but inherit from
one class only), the subtyping relation is tree-shaped and trivially forms a semi-lattice: the least
upper bound of two classes is simply their closest common ancestor in the inheritance tree.
9The downside of Sun’s approach, compared with the set-based or completion-based approach, is
that the veriﬁer cannot guarantee statically that an object reference implements a given interface.
In particular, the invokeinterface I:m instruction, which invokes method m of interface I on
an object, is not guaranteed to receive at run-time an object that actually implements I: the only
guarantee provided by Sun’s veriﬁer is that it receives an argument of type Object, that is, any
object reference. The invokeinterface I:m instruction must therefore check dynamically that
the object actually implements I, and raise an exception if it does not.
4 Verifying object initialization
Object creation in the Java virtual machine is a two-step process: ﬁrst, the instruction new C
creates a new object, instance of the class C, with all instance ﬁelds ﬁlled with default values (0 for
numerical ﬁelds and null for reference ﬁelds); second, one of the initialization methods for class C
(methods named C:<init> resulting from the compilation of the constructors of class C) must be
invoked on the newly created object. Initialization methods, just like their source-level counterpart
(constructors), are typically used to initialize instance ﬁelds to non-default values, although they
can also perform nearly arbitrary computations.
The JVM speciﬁcation requires that this two-step object initialization protocol be respected.
That is, the object instance created by the new instruction is considered uninitialized, and none of
the regular object operations (i.e. store the object in a data structure, return it as method result,
access one of its ﬁelds, invoke one of its methods) is allowed on this uninitialized object. Only when
one of the initialization methods for its class is invoked on the new object and returns normally is
the new object considered fully initialized and usable like any other object. (Additional restrictions
that we will not discuss here are imposed on initialization methods themselves; see [33, 15, 13].)
Unlike the register initialization property, this object initialization property is not crucial to
ensure type safety at run-time: since the new instruction initializes the instance ﬁelds of the new
object with correct values for their types, type safety is not broken if the resulting default-initialized
object is used right away without having called an initializer method. However, the object initializa-
tion property is important to ensure that some invariants between instance ﬁelds that is established
by the constructor of a class actually hold for all objects of this class.
Static veriﬁcation of object initialization is made more complex by the fact that initialization
methods operate by side-eﬀect: instead of taking an uninitialized object and returning an initialized
object, they simply take an uninitialized object, update its ﬁelds, and return nothing. Hence, the
code generated by Java compilers for the source-level statement x = new C(arg) is generally of
the following form:
new C // create uninitialized instance of C
dup // duplicate the reference to this instance
code to compute arg
invokespecial C.<init> // call the initializer
astore 3 // store initialized object in x
That is, two references to the uninitialized instance of C are held on the stack. The topmost
reference is “consumed” by the invocation of C.<init>. When this initializer returns, the second
reference is now at the top of the stack and now references a properly initialized object, which is
then stored in the register allocated to x. The tricky point is that the initializer method is applied
10to one object reference on the stack, but it is another object reference contained in the stack (which
happens to reference the same object) whose status goes from “uninitialized” to “fully initialized”
in the process.
As demonstrated above, static veriﬁcation of object initialization requires a form of alias analysis
(more precisely a must-alias analysis) to determine which object references in the current state are
guaranteed to refer to the same uninitialized object that is passed as argument to an initializer
method. While any must-alias analysis can be used, Sun’s veriﬁer uses a fairly simple analysis,
whereas an uninitialized object is identiﬁed by the position (program counter value) of the new
instruction that created it. More precisely, the type algebra is enriched by the types Cp denoting
an uninitialized instance of class C created by a new instruction at PC p. An invocation of an
initializer method C:<init> checks that the ﬁrst argument of the method is of type Cp for some p,
then pops the arguments oﬀ the stack type as usual, and ﬁnally ﬁnds all other occurrences of the
type Cp in the abstract interpreter state (stack type and register types) and replaces them by C.
The following example shows how this works for a nested initialization corresponding to the Java
expression new C(new C(null)):
0: new C // stack type after: C0
3: dup // C0, C0
4: new C // C0, C0, C4
7: dup // C0, C0, C4, C4
8: aconst_null // C0, C0, C4, C4, null
9: invokespecial C.<init> // C0, C0, C
12: invokespecial C.<init> // C
15: ...
In particular, the ﬁrst invokespecial initializes only the instance created at PC 4, but not the
one created at PC 0.
This approach is correct only if at any given time, the machine state contains at most one
uninitialized object created at a given PC. Thus, the veriﬁer must prevent situations where several
distinct objects created by the same instruction new C at p can be “in ﬂight”: these would be
given the same type Cp, and initializing one would cause the veriﬁer to assume incorrectly that the
others are also initialized. This could potentially happen if a new instruction is executed repeatedly
as part of a loop; another example involving subroutines is given in [15].
To avoid this problem, Sun’s veriﬁer requires that no uninitialized object type appear in the
machine state when a backward branch is taken. Freund and Mitchell [15] formalize a simpler,
equally eﬀective restriction: they propose that when verifying a new C instruction at location p,
there must be no occurrence of the type Cp in the stack type and register type at p. Bertot [3]
proves the correctness of this approach using the Coq theorem prover, and extracts a veriﬁcation
algorithm from the proof. (Bertot’s algorithm is not a standard dataﬂow analysis, since it features
an additional pass of constraint solving.)
Both Sun’s restriction and Freund and Mitchell’s restriction are not monotone, in the sense that
raising the type of a register or stack location from Cp to > can transform an abstract state from
which no transitions are possible into an abstract state from which a transition is possible. In other
terms, property 3 does not hold, and this causes diﬃculties with dataﬂow analysis. To address this
issue, a modiﬁed formulation of Freund and Mitchell’s restriction is introduced in [49] and used in
[29, 27, 13]: a new C instruction at location p does not fail if there are occurrences of the type Cp
in the stack and register types before p; instead, it sets these entries to > in the resulting state.
11This suﬃces to enforce non-aliasing (the unitialized objects whose types were set to > cannot be
initialized nor used later on), while respecting the monotonicity property.
Subroutines, as described in section 5, complicate the veriﬁcation of object initialization. As
discovered by Freund and Mitchell [15], a new instruction inside a subroutine can result in distinct
uninitialized objects having the same static type Cp, thus fooling Sun’s veriﬁer into believing that
all of them become initialized after invoking an initialization method on one of them. The solution
is to prohibit or set to > all registers and stack locations that have type Cp across a subroutine
call.
Coglio [9] observes that Sun’s restriction on backward branches as well as Freund and Mitchell’s
restriction on new are unnecessary for a bytecode veriﬁer based on monovariant dataﬂow analysis.
More precisely, [9, section 5.8.2] shows that, in the absence of subroutines, a register or stack
location cannot have the type Cp just before a program point p containing a new C instruction.
Thus, the only program points where uninitialized object types in stack types or register types
must be prohibited (or turned into >) are subroutine calls.
5 Subroutines
Subroutines in the JVM are code fragments that can be called from several points inside the code
of a method. To this end, the JVM provides two instructions: jsr branches to a given label in
the method code and pushes a return address to the following instruction; ret recovers a return
address (from a register) and branches to the corresponding instruction. Subroutines are used
to compile certain exception handling constructs, and can also be used as a general code-sharing
device. The diﬀerence between a subroutine call and a method invocation is that the body of the
subroutine executes in the same activation record as its caller, and therefore can access and modify
the registers of the caller.
5.1 The veriﬁcation problem with subroutines
Subroutines complicate signiﬁcantly bytecode veriﬁcation by dataﬂow analysis. First, it is not
obvious to determine the successors of a ret instruction, since the return address is a ﬁrst-class
value. As a ﬁrst approximation, we can say that a ret instruction can branch to any instruction
that follows a jsr in the method code. (This approximation is too coarse in practice; we will
describe better approximations later.) Second, the subroutine entry point acts as a merge point
in the control-ﬂow graph, causing the register types at the points of call to this subroutine to be
merged. This can lead to excessive loss of precision in the register types inferred, as the example
in Figure 5 shows.
The two jsr 100 at 0 and 52 have 100 as successor. At 0, register 0 has type >; at 52, it
has type int. Thus, at 100, register 0 has type > (the least upper bound of > and int). The
subroutine body (between 101 and 110) does not modify register 0, hence its type at 110 is still
>. The ret 1 at 110 has 3 and 55 as successors (the two instructions following the two jsr 100).
Thus, at 55, register 0 has type > and cannot be used as an integer by instructions 55 and 56. This
code is therefore rejected.
This behavior is counter-intuitive. Calling a subroutine that does not use a given register does
not modify the run-time value of this register, so one could expect that it does not modify the
12// register 0 uninitialized here
0: jsr 100 // call subroutine at 100
3: ...
50: iconst_0
51: istore_0 // register 0 has type ”int” here
52: jsr 100 // call subroutine at 100
55: iload_0 // load integer from register 0
56: ireturn // and return to caller
...
// subroutine at 100:
100: astore_1 // store return address in register 1
101: ... // execute some code that does not use register 0
110: ret 1 // return to caller
Figure 5: An example of subroutine
veriﬁcation-time type of this register either. Indeed, if the subroutine body was expanded inline at
the two jsr sites, bytecode veriﬁcation would succeed as expected.
The subroutine-based compilation scheme for the try...finally construct produces code very
much like the above, with a register being uninitialized at one call site of the subroutine and holding
a value preserved by the subroutine at another call site. Hence it is crucial that similar code passes
bytecode veriﬁcation. In the remainder of this section and in section 6, we will present reﬁnements
of the dataﬂow-based veriﬁcation algorithm that achieve this goal.
5.2 Sun’s solution
We ﬁrst describe the approach implemented in Sun’s JDK veriﬁer. It is described informally in
[33, section 4.9.6], and formalized (with various degrees of completeness and faithfulness to Sun’s
implementation) in [51, 44, 49, 13, 50]. This approach implements the intuition that a call to a
subroutine should not change the types of registers that are not used in the subroutine body.
First, we need to make precise what a “subroutine body” is: since JVM bytecode is unstructured,
subroutines are not syntactically delimited in the code; subroutine entry points are easily detected
(as targets of jsr instructions), but it is not immediately apparent which instructions can be
reached from a subroutine entry point. Thus, a dataﬂow analysis is performed, either before or in
parallel with the main type analysis. The outcome of this analysis is a consistent labeling of every
instruction by the entry point(s) for the subroutine(s) it logically belongs to. From this labeling,
we can then determine, for each subroutine entry point `, the return instruction Ret(`) for the
subroutine, and the set of registers Used(`) that are read or written by instructions belonging to
that subroutine.
The dataﬂow equation for subroutine calls is then as follows. Let i be an instruction jsr `, and
j be the instruction immediately following i. Let (Sjsr;Rjsr) = out(i) be the state “after” the jsr,
and (Sret;Rret) = out(Ret(`)) be the state “after” the ret that terminates the subroutine. Then:
in(j) =
µ
Sret;fr 7!
½
Rret(r) if r 2 Used(`)
Rjsr(r) if r = 2 Used(`)
g
¶
13In other terms, the state “before” the instruction j following the jsr is identical to the state “after”
the ret, except for the types of the registers that are not used by the subroutine, which are taken
from the state “after” the jsr.
In the example above, we have Ret(100) = 110 and register 0 is not in Used(100). Hence the
type of register 0 before instruction 55 (the instruction following the jsr) is equal to the type after
instruction 52 (the jsr itself), that is int, instead of > (the type of register 0 after the ret 1 at
110).
While eﬀective in practice, Sun’s approach to subroutine veriﬁcation raises a challenging is-
sue: determining the subroutine structure is diﬃcult. Not only are subroutines not syntactically
delimited, but return addresses are stored in general-purpose registers rather than on a subroutine-
speciﬁc stack, which makes tracking return addresses and matching ret/jsr pairs more diﬃcult.
To facilitate the determination of the subroutine structure, the JVM speciﬁcation states a num-
ber of restrictions on correct JVM code, such as “two diﬀerent subroutines cannot ‘merge’ their
execution to a single ret instruction” [33, section 4.9.6]. These restrictions seem rather ad-hoc
and speciﬁc to the particular subroutine labeling algorithm that Sun’s veriﬁer uses. Moreover, the
description of subroutine labeling given in the JVM speciﬁcation is very informal and incomplete.
Several rational reconstructions and formalizations of this part of Sun’s veriﬁer have been pub-
lished. The presentations closest to Sun’s implementation are due to Qian [44] and St¨ ark et al [49].
A characteristic feature of Sun’s implementation, correctly captured by these presentations, is that
the subroutine structure and the Used(`) sets are not determined prior to setting up and solving
the dataﬂow equations, as we suggested above; instead, the types and the Used(`) sets are inferred
simultaneously during the dataﬂow analysis. This simultaneous computation of types and Used(`)
sets complicates the analysis: as shown by Qian [45], the transfer function of the dataﬂow analysis
is no longer monotonous, and special iteration strategies are required to reach the ﬁxpoint.
5.3 Other approaches to the veriﬁcation of subroutines
Many alternatives to Sun’s veriﬁcation of subroutine have been proposed in the literature, often in
the context of small subsets of the JVM, leading to algorithms that are simpler and more elegant,
but do not scale to the whole JVM.
The ﬁrst formal work on subroutine veriﬁcation is due to Abadi and Stata [51]: it relies on a
separate analysis, performed before type veriﬁcation proper, that labels bytecode instructions with
the names of the subroutines they belong to, thus reconstructing the subroutine structure. The
Used(`) sets can then be computed for each subroutine `, and injected in the dataﬂow equations
as described in section 5.2.
Later work by Hagiya and Tozawa [20] also relies on prior determination of the subroutine
structure, but expresses the ﬂow of types through subroutines in a diﬀerent way, using special
types last(n) to refer to the type of register n in the caller of the subroutine. The last(n) types
behave very much like type variables in a type system featuring parametric polymorphism. In other
terms, the subroutine is given a type that is polymorphic over the types of the local variables that
it does not use.
While these works shed considerable light on the issue of subroutines, they are carried in the
context of a small subset of the JVM that excludes exceptions and object initialization in particular.
The delicate interactions between subroutines and object initialization were discussed in section 4.
As for exceptions, exception handling complicates signiﬁcantly the determination of the subroutine
14structure. Examination of bytecode produced by a Java compiler shows two possible situations:
either an exception handler covers a range of instructions entirely contained in a subroutine, in
which case the code of the exception handler should be considered as part of the same subroutine
(e.g. it can branch back to the ret instruction that terminates the subroutine); or, an exception
handler covers both instructions belonging to a subroutine and non-subroutine instructions, in
which case the code of the handler should be considered as outside the subroutine. The problem is
that in the second case, we have a branch (via the exception handler) from a subroutine instruction
to a non-subroutine instruction, and this branch is not a ret instruction; this situation is not
allowed in Abadi and Stata’s subroutine labeling system.
Thus, it is desirable to develop subroutine veriﬁcation strategies that do not rely on prior
determination of the subroutine structure, but instead “discover” this structure during veriﬁcation.
The polyvariant veriﬁcation algorithms that we discuss next in section 6 satisfy this requirement.
O’Callahan [39] proposes a diﬀerent approach, based on continuation types: the type assigned
to a return address contains the complete stack and register type expected at the program point
following the jsr instruction. However, O’Callahan gives only type checking rules, but no eﬀective
type inference algorithm.
6 Polyvariant bytecode veriﬁcation
In this paper so far, we have presented bytecode veriﬁcation as a monovariant ﬂow analysis: at each
program point, only one abstract state (register type and stack type) is considered. Polyvariant
ﬂow analyses, also called context-sensitive analyses [37, section 3.6] lift this restriction: several
states are allowed per program point. As we show in this section, polyvariant bytecode veriﬁcation
provides an alternate solution to the subroutine problem of section 5: polyvariant analysis allows
instructions inside subroutine bodies to be analyzed several times, e.g. once per call site for the
subroutine, without merging the corresponding states like the monovariant analysis of section 3.2
does.
6.1 Polyvariant veriﬁcation based on contours
The ﬁrst polyvariant bytecode veriﬁcation analysis that we describe is based on contours, and is
used in the Java Card oﬀ-card veriﬁer [53]. In contour-based polyvariant ﬂow analysis, the distinct
states maintained at each program point are indexed by contours that usually approximate the
control-ﬂow path that led to each state.
In the case of bytecode veriﬁcation, contours are subroutine call stacks: lists of return ad-
dresses for the sequence of jsr instructions that led to the corresponding state. In the absence
of subroutines, all the bytecode for a method is analyzed in the empty contour. Thus, only one
state is associated to each instruction and the analysis degenerates into the monovariant dataﬂow
analysis of section 3.2. However, when a jsr ` instruction is encountered in the current contour
c, it is treated as a branch to the instruction at ` in the augmented contour `:c. Similarly, a ret
r instruction is treated as a branch that restricts the current context c by popping one or several
return addresses from c (as determined by the type of the register r).
In the example of Figure 5, the two jsr 100 instructions are analyzed in the empty context ".
This causes two “in” states to be associated with the instruction at 100; one has contour 3:", assigns
15type > to register 0, and contains retaddr(3) at the top of the stack1; the other state has contour
55:", assigns type int to register 0, and contains retaddr(55) at the top of the stack. Then, the
instructions at 101...110 are analyzed twice, in the two contours 3:" and 55:". In the contour 3:",
the ret 1 at 110 is treated as a branch to 3, where register 0 still has type >. In the contour
55:", the ret 1 is treated as a branch to 55 with register 0 still having type int. By analyzing
the subroutine body in a polyvariant way, under two diﬀerent contours, we avoided merging the
types > and int of register 0 at the subroutine entry point, and thus obtained the desired type
propagation behavior for register 0: > before and after the jsr 100 at 3, but int before and after
the jsr 100 at 52.
More formally, the polyvariant dataﬂow equation for a jsr ` instruction at i followed by an
instruction at j is
in(`;j:c) = (retaddr(j):S;T) where (S;T) = out(i;c)
For a ret r instruction at i, the equation is
in(j;c0) = out(i;c)
where the type of register r in the state out(i;c) is retaddr(j) and the context c0 is obtained from
c by popping return addresses until j is found, that is, c = c00:j:c0. Finally, for instructions i other
than jsr and ret, the equation is simply
i : in(i;c) ! out(i;c)
that is, the instruction triggers no change of contour.
Another way to view polyvariant veriﬁcation is that it is exactly equivalent to performing
monovariant veriﬁcation on an expanded version of the bytecode where every subroutine call has
been replaced by a distinct copy of the subroutine body. Instead of actually taking N copies of
the subroutine body, we analyze them N times in N diﬀerent contours. Of course, duplicating
subroutine bodies before the monovariant veriﬁcation is not practical, because it requires prior
knowledge of the subroutine structure (to determine which instructions are part of which subroutine
body), and as shown in section 5.3, the subroutine structure is hard to determine exactly. The
beauty of the polyvariant analysis is that it determines the subroutine structure along the way, via
the computations on contours performed during the dataﬂow analysis. Moreover, this determination
takes advantage of typing information such as the retaddr(ra) types to determine with certainty
the point to which a ret instruction branches in case of an early return from nested subroutines.
Another advantage of polyvariant veriﬁcation is that it handles code that is reachable both
from subroutine bodies and from the main program, such as the exception handlers mentioned in
section 5.3: rather than deciding whether such exception handlers are part of a subroutine or not,
the polyvariant analysis simply analyzes them several times, once in the empty contour and once
or several times in subroutine contours.
One downside of polyvariant veriﬁcation is that it is more computationally expensive than Sun’s
approach. In particular, if subroutines are nested to depth N, and each subroutine is called k times,
the instructions from the innermost subroutine are analyzed kN times instead of only once in Sun’s
algorithm. However, typical Java code has low nesting of subroutines: most methods have N · 1,
very few have N = 2, and N > 2 is unheard of. Hence, the extra cost of polyvariant veriﬁcation is
entirely acceptable in practice.
1The type retaddr(i) represents a return address to the instruction at i. It is subtype of > and itself only.
16while (true) f 0: invokestatic m
try f 3: jsr 15
m(); 6: goto 0
g finally f 9: astore 0 // exception handler
continue; 10: jsr 15
g 13: aload 0
g 14: athrow
15: astore 1 // subroutine
16: goto 0
Exception table: [0;2] ! 9
Figure 6: The problem with contour-based polyvariant veriﬁcation (left: Java source code; right:
corresponding JVM bytecode)
A more serious drawback of this approach is that contour-based polyvariant veriﬁcation can fail
to accept valid JVM code because the subroutine structure that it infers through the construction of
contours can be inﬁnite. Consider the Java method shown in Figure 6, along with the corresponding
JVM code. The subroutine at 15 does not terminate by a ret instruction, but by a goto 0 that
branches back to the non-subroutine part of the method code. (This branch corresponds to the
continue statement in the source code.)
Polyvariant veriﬁcation starts by analyzing instructions at 0, 3 and 6 in the empty contour ".
The jsr 15 at 3 causes instructions at 15 and 16 to be analyzed in the contour 15:". The goto 0
at 16 does not aﬀect the contour (unlike a ret instruction), thus causing instructions at 0, 3 and 6
to be re-analyzed in the contour 15:". Iterating this process, we end up analyzing instructions 0, 3
and 6 in an inﬁnite number of contexts: ", 15:", 15:15:", ... Thus, veriﬁcation does not terminate.
Alternatively, termination can be ensured by requiring that contours never contain twice the
same subroutine label: a jsr ` in a contour containing ` is rejected, in accordance with the JVM
speciﬁcation that states that subroutines cannot be recursive. (This is what the Java Card veriﬁer
[53] does.) But in this case we end up rejecting a valid piece of JVM bytecode, generated by
compilation of a valid (albeit artiﬁcial) Java program.
As demonstrated by this example, using data-independent contours to direct polyvariant ver-
iﬁcation can cause too many – or even inﬁnitely many – diﬀerent states to be kept for a given
program point, even if these states are exactly identical. (In the example, the states at point 0 in
contours 15:", 15:15:", etc, are all identical.) We now describe an alternate approach to polyvariant
veriﬁcation, not using contours, that avoids these issues.
6.2 Model checking of abstract interpretations
It is folk lore that dataﬂow analyses can be viewed as model checking of abstract interpretations [48].
Since a large part of bytecode veriﬁcation is obviously an abstract interpretation (of a defensive JVM
at the type level), it is natural to look at the remaining parts from a model-checking perspective.
Posegga and Vogt [40] were the ﬁrst to do so. They outline an algorithm that takes the bytecode
for a method and generates a temporal logic formula that holds if and only if the bytecode is safe.
They then use an oﬀ-the-shelf model checker to determine the validity of the formula. While this
17application uses only a small part of the power and generality of temporal logic and of the model
checker, the approach sounds interesting for establishing ﬁner properties of the bytecode that go
beyond the basic safety properties of bytecode veriﬁcation (see section 8). The article by Basin et
al. in this volume [2] explores the model-checking approach to bytecode veriﬁcation in great details.
Brisset [4] and independently Coglio [8] extract the essence of the “model checking” approach:
the idea of exploring all reachable states of the abstract interpreter. They consider the transition
relation obtained by combining the transition relation of the type-level abstract interpreter (Fig-
ure 2) with the “successor” relation between instructions. This relation is of the form (p;S;R) !
(p0;S0;R0), meaning that the abstract interpreter, started at PC p with stack type S and register
type R, can abstractly execute the instruction at p and arrive at PC p0 with stack type S0 and
register type R0. Additional transitions (p;S;R) ! err are introduce to reﬂect states (p;S;R) in
which the abstract interpreter is “stuck” (cannot make a transition because some check failed).
(p;S;R) ! (p0;S0;R0) if instr(p) : (S;R) ! (S0;R0)
and p0 is a successor of p
(p;S;R) ! err if instr(p) : (S;R) 6!
The BC (Brisset-Coglio) veriﬁcation algorithm simply explores all states reachable by
repeated applications of the extended transition relation starting with the initial state
¾0 = (0;";(P0;:::;Pn¡1;>;:::;>)) corresponding to the method entry. In other terms, writing
C(Σ) = Σ [ f¾0 j 9¾ 2 Σ: ¾ ! ¾0g for the one-step closure of a set of states Σ, the BC
algorithm computes by ﬁxpoint iteration the smallest set Σc containing ¾0 and closed under C. If
err 2 Σc, the error state is reachable and the bytecode is rejected. Otherwise, the bytecode passes
veriﬁcation. In the latter case (err is not reachable), the correctness of the abstract interpretation
(as proved in [43]) guarantees that the concrete, defensive JVM interpreter will never fail a safety
check during the execution of the method code, hence the bytecode is safe.
This algorithm always terminates because the number of distinct states is ﬁnite (albeit large),
since there is a ﬁnite number of distinct types used in the program, and the height of the stack is
bounded, and the number of registers is ﬁxed.
The problem with subroutines described in section 5.1 completely disappears in this approach.
It suﬃces to use the following transitions for the jsr and ret instructions:
(p;S;R) ! (`;retaddr(p + 3):S;R) if instr(p) = jsr `
(p;S;R) ! (q;S;R) if instr(p) = ret r and R(r) = retaddr(q)
(p;S;R) ! err if instr(p) = ret r and R(r) 6= retaddr(q)
The fact that the BC algorithm never merges the types inferred along two execution paths leading
to the same instruction guarantees that subroutine bodies are analyzed as many times as necessary
to propagate type information correctly across subroutine calls. However, we will never consider
twice the same stack and register types at a given point, thus guaranteeing termination and avoiding
the problem with contour-based polyvariance. For instance, the example of Figure 6 that cannot be
accepted by contour-based polyvariant veriﬁcation is now correctly accepted: instructions at 0, 3
and 6 are veriﬁed exactly twice, once under the assumption r0 : >, the other under the assumption
r0 : retaddr(3).
Another interest of this approach is that it allows us to reconsider some of the design decisions
explained in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 4. In particular, the BC algorithm never computes least upper
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or
r0 : E
r0 : D r0 : E
r1 : D r1 : E
r2 : D r2 : E
. . .
rn : D rn : E
2n register types
(D;:::;D) to (E;:::;E)
Figure 7: Control-ﬂow joins in the model-checking approach
bounds of types, but simply checks subtyping relations between types. Thus, it can be applied
to any well-founded subtyping relation, not just relations that form a semi-lattice. Indeed, it can
keep track of interface types and verify invokeinterface instructions accurately, without having
to deal with sets of types or lattice completion. Similarly, it is possible to verify code where the
stack size is not the same on all paths leading to an instruction.
Brisset [4] formalized and proved the correctness of this approach in the Coq proof assistant,
and extracted the ML code of a bytecode veriﬁer from the proof. Klein and Wildmoser [26]
also prove the correctness of this approach using Isabelle/HOL. Their proof builds on a generic
dataﬂow analysis framework, and thus seems reusable for the variants of the BC algorithm discussed
in section 6.3. Coglio [8] argues that the BC veriﬁcation algorithm is the most precise of all
“reasonable” veriﬁcation algorithms, in the sense that it accepts all bytecode that does not crash a
defensive virtual machine that would follow all execution paths across conditional jumps, regardless
of the value of the condition. Thus, the only correct bytecode that could be rejected by the BC
algorithm is bytecode whose correctness depends on additional knowledge on the values (and not
just the types) of booleans, integers and object references manipulated by the code.
6.3 Widening in the model checking approach
The BC veriﬁcation algorithm based on model checking, described in section 6.2, can be impractical:
it runs in time exponential in the number of conditional or N-way branches in the method. Consider
the control-ﬂow joint depicted in Figure 7, left part. While the dataﬂow-based algorithms verify the
instructions following the join point only once under the assumption r : C where C = lub(D;E),
the BC algorithm veriﬁes them twice, once under the assumption r : D, once under the assumption
r : E. Consider now the control-ﬂow graph shown in the right part of Figure 7. It comprises N
such conditional constructs in sequence, each assigning a diﬀerent type to registers r1 :::rN. This
causes the instructions following the last conditional to be veriﬁed 2N times under 2N diﬀerent
register types.
One way to improve the eﬃciency of the BC algorithm is to reduce the number of states that need
be explored via judicious application of widening steps: some transitions (pc;S;R) ! (pc0;S0;R0)
can be replaced by (pc;S;R) ! (pc0;S00;R00) where R0 <: R00 and S0 <: S00. If the error state err
is still not reachable, the bytecode remains safe. A widening step such as the above reduces the
total number of states to be explored if we judiciously choose R00 and S00, e.g. if the widened state
19(pc0;S00;R00) is already reachable.
More formally, deﬁne a subtyping relation between states by ¾ <: err for all states ¾, and
(p;S;R) <: (p0;S0;R0) if p = p0, S <: S0 and R <: R0. A widening scheme W is a function from
sets of states to sets of states, such that for all state ¾ 2 Σ, there exists a state ¾0 2 W(Σ) such
that ¾ <: ¾0. Note that this property implies that if err 2 Σ, then err 2 W(Σ).
Bytecode veriﬁcation by “widened model checking”, then, computes by ﬁxpoint iteration of
W ± C the smallest state set Σw containing the initial state ¾0 and such that W(C(Σw)) = Σw.
The bytecode passes veriﬁcation if and only if err = 2 Σw.
It is easy to show that all bytecode accepted by a widened model checking algorithm is also
accepted by the BC model checking algorithm, and is therefore type-safe at runtime. The proof is
given in appendix A.
As proposed in [23], we can construct interesting examples of widening functions from an equiv-
alence relation ¼ determining which states should be merged in a single state, and a merging
function M from sets of equivalent states to states such that ¾ <: M(Σ) for all ¾ 2 Σ. The
widening function W is then deﬁned by
W(Σ) = fM(Σ1);:::;M(Σn)g
where Σ1;:::;Σn is a partition of Σ in equivalence classes for the ¼ relation. The W function thus
deﬁned is a widening function, since for every ¾ 2 Σ, writing Σi for the equivalence class of ¾ in
Σ, we have ¾ <: M(Σi) 2 W(Σ).
The monovariant dataﬂow analysis of section 3.2 is a trivial instance of widened model checking
where the widening function W merges all stack and register types associated with the same program
point by taking their least upper bound. More precisely, the widening function is constructed as
described above from the following equivalence relations and merging functions. The equivalence
relation ¼ is deﬁned by err ¼ err and (p1;S1;R1) ¼ (p2;S2;R2) if and only if p1 = p2. The
merging function is deﬁned by
M(ferrg) = err
M(f(p;S1;R1);:::;(p;Sn;Rn)g) = (p;lub(S1;:::;Sn);lub(R1;:::;Rn))
if jS1j = ::: = jSnj
M(f(p;S1;R1);:::;(p;Sn;Rn)g) = err, otherwise
A more interesting widening function is described by Henrio and Serpette [23]. Similar ideas
were implemented by Frey [16] and by Coglio [8]. They propose to merge stack and register types
at a given program point if and only if these types agree on return addresses, that is, contain the
same retaddr(p) types in the same registers or stack slots, but may diﬀer on non-retaddr types.
More precisely, we say that two types agree on return addresses if they are equal, or none of
them is a retaddr type. Two register types agree on return addresses if the types they assign to
every register agree. Two stack types agree on return addresses if they have the same size, and
the types they contain agree pointwise. Then, deﬁne the equivalence relation ¼ by err ¼ err and
(p1;S1;R1) ¼ (p2;S2;R2) if and only if p1 = p2 and S1;S2 agree on return addresses, and R1;R2
agree on return addresses. The merging function is deﬁned by
M(ferrg) = err
M(f(p;S1;R1);:::;(p;Sn;Rn)g = (p;lub(S1;:::;Sn);lub(R1;:::;Rn))
20(By construction of ¼, M is never presented with stack types of diﬀerent heights.) The CFHS
(Coglio-Frey-Henrio-Serpette) veriﬁcation algorithm, then, corresponds to widened model checking
using the widening function induced by the ¼ relation and M merging function.
In bytecode that contains no subroutines, stack and register types never contain return address
types, thus always agree on return addresses; in this case, the CFHS algorithm essentially reduces
to standard, eﬃcient monovariant dataﬂow analysis2. In the presence of subroutines, however,
suﬃcient polyvariance is ensured because return address types prevent type merging inside sub-
routines. In the example of Figure 5, analysis of the two jsr at 0 and 52 causes two states with
pc = 100 to be explored: one has retaddr(3) at the top of the stack type, and > as the type of
register 0; the other has retaddr(55) at the top of the stack type, and int as the type of register 0.
These two states disagree on return addresses (namely, on the top element of the stack type), thus
are not merged. This causes the astore_1 at 100 to be analyzed twice, resulting in two states
at 101 that are not mergeable either because one has retaddr(3) for register 1 and the other has
retaddr(55) for register 1. Thus, the instructions in the subroutine body (from 100 to 110) are
given two independent sets of stack and register types, as needed to verify the two subroutine calls
with suﬃcient precision.
In appendix B, we prove that the CFHS algorithm accepts exactly the same bytecode as the BC
algorithm. In other terms, it turns out that the additional merging of type information performed
in the CFHS algorithm does not degrade the precision of the analysis. This is a consequence of the
following “continuity” property of the type-level abstract interpreter with respect to least upper
bounds.
Property 4 (Continuity.) Assume that the stack types S1 and S2 agree on return addresses, and
the register types R1 and R2 agree on return addresses. Further assume that i : (S1;R1) ! (S0
1;R0
1)
and i : (S2;R2) ! (S0
2;R0
2). Then, i : (lub(S1;S2);lub(R1;R2)) ! (lub(S0
1;S0
2);lub(R0
1;R0
2)):
7 Bytecode veriﬁcation on small computers
Java virtual machines run not only in personal computers and workstations, but also in a vari-
ety of embedded computers, such as personal digital assistants, mobile phones, and smart cards.
Extending the Java model of safe post-issuance code downloading to these devices requires that
bytecode veriﬁcation be performed on the embedded system itself. However, bytecode veriﬁcation
is an expensive process that can exceed the resources (processing power and working memory space)
of small embedded systems. For instance, a typical Java card (Java-enabled smart card) has 1 or
2 kilo-bytes of working memory, 16 to 32 kilo-bytes of rewritable persistent memory3, and an 8-bit
microprocessor that is approximately 1000 times slower than a personal computer.
On such small computing devices, a conventional bytecode veriﬁcation algorithm (such as Sun’s
or any of the polyvariant veriﬁers described in this paper) cannot run in working memory: the
2One minor diﬀerence with monovariant dataﬂow analysis is that the latter fails if the stack height diﬀers on
several paths that reach a given program point, while the CFHS algorithm does not fail immediately in this case,
but analyzes the join point and its successors in a polyvariant manner, once per diﬀerent stack height. At any rate,
subroutine-free bytecode that passes monovariant veriﬁcation also passes the CFHS algorithm, with only one state
being considered for each program point.
3Rewritable persistent memory (EEPROM or Flash) is distinct from working memory (RAM) in that writes to
the former take 1000–10000 times longer than writes to the latter. Moreover, rewritable persistent memory allows a
limited number of writes to the same memory location.
21amount of RAM available is too small to store the stack and register types inferred during bytecode
veriﬁcation. One avenue is to use persistent rewritable memory instead of RAM to hold the data
structures of the veriﬁer. It was long believed that this solution was impractical, because these
data structures change rapidly during bytecode veriﬁcation, resulting in excessive writing times and
“wear” on the persistent memory. Recent work by Deville and Grimaud [12] develops specially-
designed encodings of types and memory representations of the veriﬁcation data that alleviate this
issue, and suggests that this approach is indeed feasible.
Another avenue for ﬁtting a bytecode veriﬁer into a small computing device is to design new
veriﬁcation algorithms that can run in tiny amounts of working memory. We now discuss two such
algorithms.
7.1 Lightweight bytecode veriﬁcation using certiﬁcates
Inspired by Necula and Lee’s proof-carrying code [36], Rose and Rose [47] propose to split bytecode
veriﬁcation into two phases: the code producer computes the stack and register types at branch
targets and transmit these so-called certiﬁcates along with the bytecode; the embedded system,
then, simply checks that the code is well-typed with respect to the types given in the certiﬁcates,
rather than inferring these types itself. In other terms, the embedded system no longer solves
iteratively the dataﬂow equations characterizing correct bytecode, but simply checks (in a single,
linear pass over the bytecode) that the types provided in the code certiﬁcates are indeed a solution
of these equations.
The beneﬁts of this approach are twofold. First, checking a solution is faster than inferring
one, since we avoid the cost of the ﬁxpoint iteration. This speeds up veriﬁcation to some extent4.
Second, certiﬁcates are only read, but never modiﬁed during veriﬁcation. Hence, they can be stored
in persistent rewritable memory without risking to “wear” this memory space by repeated rewriting
of the data during veriﬁcation.
A practical limitation of this approach is that certiﬁcates are relatively large: about 50% of the
size of the code they annotate [31]. Even if certiﬁcates are stored in persistent memory, they can
still exceed the available memory space.
Later work by Rose [46] addresses the issue of the certiﬁcate size by noticing that type informa-
tion for certain branch targets can be omitted from the certiﬁcate, as long as this type information
is correctly computed by the veriﬁcation algorithm during its linear scan of the bytecode. This
hybrid veriﬁcation strategy thus reduces the size of the certiﬁcate, at the cost of increased working
memory requirements to store the inferred type information for branch targets not described in the
certiﬁcate.
Lightweight bytecode veriﬁcation is used in the KVM, one of Sun’s embedded variants of the
JVM [52]. It was formalized and proved sound and complete by Klein and Nipkow [28, 27], using
the Isabelle/HOL prover. These presentations diﬀer in their treatment of subroutines. Rose’s
presentation [47, 46] deals only with monovariant veriﬁcation and does not handle subroutines. The
KVM implementation follows this approach, and relies on subroutine expansion before veriﬁcation,
as part of the certiﬁcate generation phase. Klein and Nipkow’s formalization, however, is applicable
not only to monovariant veriﬁcation, but to any veriﬁcation algorithm that can be expressed using
dataﬂow equations, including the polyvariant algorithms of section 6.
4The speedup is not as important as one might expect, since experiments show that the ﬁxpoint is usually reached
after examining every instruction at most twice [31].
227.2 On-card veriﬁcation with oﬀ-card code transformation
The Java Card bytecode veriﬁer described in [31] attacks the memory problem from another angle.
Like the standard bytecode veriﬁers, it solves dataﬂow equations using ﬁxpoint iteration. To reduce
memory requirements, however, it has only one global register type that is shared between all control
points in the method. In other terms, the solution it infers is such that a given register has the
same type throughout the method. For similar reasons, it also requires that the expression stack
be empty at each branch instruction and at each branch target instruction.
With these extra restrictions, bytecode veriﬁcation can be done in space O(Mstack + Mreg),
instead of O(Nbranch£(Mstack+Mreg)) for Sun’s algorithm, where Nbranch is the number of branch
targets. In practice, the memory requirements are small enough that all data structures ﬁt com-
fortably in RAM on a smart card.
One drawback of this approach is that register initialization can no longer be checked statically,
and must be replaced by run-time initialization of registers to a safe value (typically, the value of
null) on method entry. Another drawback is that the extra restrictions imposed by the on-card
veriﬁer cause perfectly legal bytecode (that passes Sun’s veriﬁer) to be rejected.
To address the latter issue, this veriﬁer relies on an oﬀ-card transformation, performed on
the bytecode of the applet, that transforms any legal bytecode (that passes Sun’s veriﬁer) into
equivalent bytecode that passes the on-card veriﬁer. The oﬀ-card transformations include stack
normalizations around branches and register reallocation by graph coloring, and are described in
[31].
These transformations can increase the size of the code, as well as the number of registers used
by a method. However, experience shows that these increases are minimal: on typical Java Card
code, the increase in code size is less than 2%, and the increase in registers is negligible [31].
This oﬀ-card code transformation phase plays a role similar to that of adding certiﬁcates in Rose
and Rose’s approach: both are oﬀ-card processing that adds enough information to the applet
to facilitate its on-card veriﬁcation. However, the oﬀ-card code transformer embeds directly its
information inside the code, via code transformations, instead of storing it into separate certiﬁcates.
Moreover, the size of the extra information is much smaller (2% vs. 50%).
8 Conclusions and perspectives
Java bytecode veriﬁcation is now a well-researched technique. The considerable body of formal
work reviewed in this paper led not only to a precise understanding of what bytecode veriﬁcation is
and what it guarantees, but also to a number of new veriﬁcation algorithms (besides Sun’s original
implementation) that cover a large part of the precision/cost spectrum.
A largely open question is whether bytecode veriﬁcation can go beyond basic type safety and
initialization properties, and statically establish more advanced properties of applets, such as re-
source usage (bounding the amount of memory allocated) and reactiveness (bounding the running
time of an applet between two interactions with the outside world). Controlling resource usage is
especially important for Java Card applets: since Java Card does not guarantee the presence of a
garbage collector, applets are supposed to allocate all the objects they need at installation time,
then run in constant space.
Other properties of interest include access control and information ﬂow. Currently, the Java se-
curity manager performs all access control checks dynamically, using stack inspection [18]. Various
23static analyses and program transformations have been proposed to perform some of these checks
statically [25, 57, 42]. In the Java Card world, inter-applet communications via shared objects
raises delicate security issues; [7] applies model-checking technology to this problem. As for infor-
mation ﬂow (an applet does not “leak” conﬁdential information that it can access), this property
is essentially impossible to check dynamically; several type systems have been proposed to enforce
it statically [56, 55, 22, 1, 41].
Finally, the security of the sandbox model relies not only on bytecode veriﬁcation, but also on
the proper implementation of the API given to the applet. The majority of known applet-based
attacks exploit bugs in the API in a type-safe way, rather than breaking type safety through bugs in
the veriﬁer. Veriﬁcation of the API is a promising area of application for formal methods [32, 24].
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A Correctness of widened model checking
In this appendix, we formally prove that all bytecode accepted by a widened model checking
algorithm (section 6.3) is also accepted by the BC model checking algorithm (section 6.2, and is
therefore type-safe at runtime. In the following, W stands for an arbitrary widening function.
Lemma 1 Let ¾1;¾2;¾0
1 be three states such that ¾1 <: ¾2 and ¾1 ! ¾0
1. Further assume that
¾2 6= err and ¾2 6! err. Then, there exists ¾0
2 such that ¾2 ! ¾0
2 and ¾0
1 <: ¾0
2.
Proof: We ﬁrst show that ¾0
1 6= err. Assume, by way of contradiction, that ¾1 ! err. This
means that ¾1 = (pc;S1;R1) and the type-level abstract interpreter cannot make a transition from
(S1;R1) on instruction instr(pc). By hypotheses ¾1 <: ¾2 and ¾2 6= err, we have ¾2 = (pc;S2;R2)
with S1 <: S2 and R1 <: R2. The monotonicity property of the abstract interpreter guarantees that
it cannot make a transition from (S2;R2) on instr(pc). Thus, ¾2 ! err, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, ¾0
1 6= err, and by deﬁnition of the ! and <: relations, this implies ¾1 6= err and
¾2 6= err. We can therefore write
¾1 = (p;S1;R1) ¾0
1 = (p0;S0
1;R0
1) ¾2 = (p;S2;R2)
and the following properties hold:
S1 <: S2 R1 <: R2 instr(p) : (S1;R1) ! (S0
1;R0
1)
By hypothesis ¾2 6! err, the abstract interpreter can make a transition on instr(p) from state
(S2;R2). Let (S0
2;R0
2) be the result of this transition. The monotonicity and determinacy prop-
erties of the type-level abstract interpreter guarantee that S0
1 <: S0
2 and R0
1 <: R0
2. Deﬁne
¾0
2 = (p0;S0
2;R0
2). We thus have ¾0
1 <: ¾0
2.
To conclude the proof, it remains to show that ¾2 ! ¾0
2. Since instr(p) : (S2;R2) ! (S0
2;R0
2), it
suﬃces to show that p0 is a valid successor of the instruction at p in state (S2;R2). By hypothesis
¾1 ! ¾0
1, we know that p0 is a valid successor of the instruction at p in state (S1;R1). If the
24instruction at p is not a ret instruction, its successors are independent of the stack and register
types “before” the instruction; thus, ¾2 ! ¾0
2. If the instruction at p is ret r, we have R1(r) =
retaddr(p0). Since ¾2 6! err, it must be the case that R2(r) is a retaddr type. Moreover,
R1 <: R2. This entails R2(r) = R1(r) = retaddr(p0). Hence, p0 is the successor of the instruction
at p in state (S2;R2). The expected result ¾2 ! ¾0
2 follows. 2
In the following, we write Σ v Σ0 to mean that for all ¾ 2 Σ, there exists ¾0 2 Σ0 such that
¾ <: ¾0.
Lemma 2 Let Σ and Σ0 be two sets of states such that Σ v Σ0 and err = 2 C(Σ0). Then, C(Σ) v
W(C(Σ0)).
Proof: The v relation is transitive, and by hypothesis on the widening function W, we have
Σ v W(Σ) for all Σ. It therefore suﬃces to show that C(Σ) v C(Σ0).
Choose ¾ in C(Σ). By deﬁnition of C, one of the following two cases holds:
² ¾ 2 Σ. Since Σ v Σ0, there exists ¾0 2 Σ0 such that ¾ <: ¾0. Since Σ0 µ C(Σ0), it follows that
¾ is a subtype of an element of C(Σ0).
² ½ ! ¾ for some ½ 2 Σ. Let ½0 be an element of Σ0 such that ½ <: ½0. By hypothesis
err = 2 C(Σ0), we have ½0 6= err and ½0 6! err. Applying lemma 1, we obtain ¾0 such that
½0 ! ¾0 and ¾ <: ¾0. Moreover, ¾0 2 C(Σ0) since ¾0 is obtained by taking one transition from
an element of Σ0.
Since the result above holds for all ¾ 2 C(Σ), the expected result follows. 2
Theorem 1 Let Σc be the smallest set closed under C containing ¾0, and Σw be the smallest set
closed under W±C containing ¾0. Then, err = 2 Σw implies err = 2 Σc. In other terms, if the bytecode
passes a widened model checking algorithm, it also passes the BC model-checking algorithm.
Proof: Write Σc =
S
n2N Σn
c and Σw =
S
n2N Σn
w, where Σ0
c = Σ0
w = f¾0g and Σn+1
c = C(Σn
c) and
Σn+1
c = W(C(Σn
c)).
We now show by induction on n that Σn
c v Σn
w. The base case n = 0 is trivial. The inductive
case follows from lemma 2, noticing that err = 2 Σw implies err = 2 C(Σn
w) for all n.
It follows that Σc v Σw. Assume, by way of contradiction, that err 2 Σc. Thus, there exists
¾ 2 Σw such that err <: ¾. By deﬁnition of the <: relation between states, this implies ¾ = err
and contradicts the hypothesis err = 2 Σw. Hence err = 2 Σc as claimed. 2
B Relative completeness of the CFHS algorithm
In this appendix, we prove that the CFHS veriﬁcation algorithm (deﬁned in section 6.3 as an
instance of widened model checking) is complete with respect to the BC model-checking algorithm:
all programs accepted by the latter algorithm are also accepted by the former. Combined with
theorem 1, this result shows that the CFHS algorithm accepts exactly the same programs as the
BC algorithm.
We recall the deﬁnitions that describe the CFHS algorithm: the equivalence relation ¼ is deﬁned
by err ¼ err and (p1;S1;R1) ¼ (p2;S2;R2) iﬀ p1 = p2 and S1;S2 agree on return addresses
25and R1;R2 agree on return addresses. The merging function M is deﬁned by M(ferrg) = err
and M(f(p;S1;R1);:::;(p;Sn;Rn)g) = (p;lub(S1;:::;Sn);lub(R1;:::;Rn)). Finally, the widening
function W is deﬁned by W(Σ) = fM(Σ1);:::;M(Σn)g where Σ1;:::;Σn is a partition of Σ into
equivalence classes for ¼.
The following key lemma shows that the type-level abstract machine performs parallel transi-
tions from a set of equivalent states and from the single state obtained by merging the equivalent
states. In particular, if err is not reachable from the equivalent states, it is not reachable from the
merged state either. We write T(Σ) for the states reachable by one transition from a state in Σ,
that is, T(Σ) = f¾0 j 9¾ 2 Σ: ¾ ! ¾0g.
Lemma 3 Let Σ be a non-empty set of equivalent states such that err = 2 Σ and err = 2 T(Σ). We
then have W(T(Σ)) = T(W(Σ)).
Proof: Write Σ = f(p;S1;R1);:::;(p;Sn;Rn)g where the Si agree on return addresses, and the
Ri also agree on return addresses. Since err = 2 T(Σ), for every i, there exists S0
i and R0
i such
that instr(p) : (Si;Ri) ! (S0
i;R0
i). According to the continuity property 4, we thus have instr(p) :
(lub(S1 :::Sn);lub(R1 :::Rn)) ! (lub(S0
1 :::S0
n);lub(R0
1 :::R0
n)). Moreover, by the determinacy
property 2, there are no other transitions from these initial states.
Consider the successors of the instruction at p. If instr(p) is not a ret instruction, these
successors p1;:::;pk depend only on instr(p) and are independent of the stack and register types.
If instr(p) is a ret r instruction, the successor for the instruction is determined by the retaddr
type found in R(r), where R is the register type before the instruction. However, the register
types “before” considered in this proof, namely R1;:::;Rn and lub(R1;:::;Rn), all agree on return
addresses. This means that they all assign the same retaddr type to register r. Thus, the successor
for the ret r instruction at p is the same in all these register types, just as in the case of a non-ret
instruction at p.
It follows from this discussion of successors that the set T(Σ) of states reachable by one transition
from Σ is exactly the cartesian product of the set of possible successors p1;:::;pk with the set of
stack and register types “after” (S0
1;R0
1);:::;(S0
n;R0
n), and similarly for T(W(Σ)):
T(Σ) = f(pi;S0
j;R0
j) j i 2 f1;:::;kg; j 2 f1;:::;ngg
T(W(Σ)) = f(pi;lub(S0
1 :::S0
n);lub(R0
1 :::R0
n)) j i 2 f1;:::;kgg
Finally, notice that the stack and register types “after” S0
1;:::;S0
n and R0
1;:::;R0
n agree on return
addresses: if instr(p) is not a jsr instruction, any retaddr type in the state after comes from a
matching retaddr type in the state before; if instr(p) is a jsr instruction, the state after contains
an additional retaddr(p + 3) type at the top of the stack, but this type is the same in all stack
types after. Thus,
W(T(Σ)) = f(pi;lub(S0
1 :::S0
n);lub(R0
1 :::R0
n)) j i 2 f1;:::;kgg:
It follows that W(T(Σ)) = T(W(Σ)) as expected. 2
We now prove a number of algebraic properties of the M and W functions.
Lemma 4 Let Σ be a non-empty set of equivalent states. Then, M(Σ) is equivalent to every ¾ 2 Σ.
26Proof: We ﬁrst show that if two types ¿1 and ¿2 agree on return addresses, then lub(¿1;¿2) agrees
on return addresses with both ¿1 and ¿2. Indeed, either ¿1 = ¿2, in which case lub(¿1;¿2) = ¿1 = ¿2
and the result is obvious; or neither ¿1 nor ¿2 are retaddr types, in which case lub(¿1;¿2) is not a
retaddr type either, thus agrees with ¿1 and with ¿2.
The previous result extends trivially to the least upper bound of one or several stack types, or
one or several register types.
Let Σ be a non-empty set of equivalent states. Either Σ = ferrg, or Σ =
f(p;S1;R1);:::;(p;Sn;Rn)g. In the former case, M(Σ) = err and the expected result
obviously holds. In the latter case, M(Σ) = (p;lub(S1;:::;Sn);lub(R1;:::;Rn)). For every i,
lub(S1;:::;Sn) and Si agree on return addresses, and lub(R1;:::;Rn) and Ri agree on return
addresses. Thus, M(Σ) ¼ ¾ for any ¾ 2 Σ. 2
Lemma 5 Let Σ1;:::;Σn be non-empty sets of states such that all states in Σ1 [ ::: [ Σn are
equivalent. Then, M(Σ1 [ ::: [ Σn) = M(fM(Σ1);:::;M(Σn)g).
Proof: There are two cases to consider. In the ﬁrst case, the Σi are all ferrg. In this case, the
expected equality trivially holds. In the second case, err does not belong to any Σi. Write
Σi = f(p;Si;1;Ri;1);:::;(p;Si;ni;Ri;ni)g
We thus have
M(Σi) = (p;lubj(Si;j);lubj(Ri;j))
M(Σ1 [ ::: [ Σn) = (p;lubi;j(Si;j);lubi;j(Ri;j))
By hypothesis, all elements of Σi are equivalent to all elements of Σj. By lemma 4, M(Σi) is
equivalent to all elements of Σi, and M(Σj) is equivalent to all elements of Σj. By transitivity, it
follows that M(Σi) ¼ M(Σj). This holds for all i;j. We thus have
M(fM(Σ1);:::;M(Σn)g) = (p;lubi(lubj(Si;j));lubi(lubj(Ri;j))):
The expected result follows from the associativity and commutativity of the lub operation. 2
Lemma 6 W(Σ1 [ ::: [ Σn) = W(W(Σ1) [ ::: [ W(Σn)) for all sets of states Σ1;:::;Σn.
Proof: Let A1;:::;Ak be a partition of Σ1 [ ::: [ Σn into equivalence classes. Thus, for every i,
fAj \ Σi j j 2 f1:::kg;Aj \ Σi 6= ;g is a partition of Σi into equivalence classes. We thus have
W(Σ1) [ ::: [ W(Σn)
= fM(Aj \ Σi) j j 2 f1:::kg;i 2 f1:::ng;Aj \ Σi 6= ;g
Consider two elements of this set, M(Aj \ Σi) and M(Aj0 \ Σi0). By lemma 4, the former is
equivalent to every element of Aj \ Σi, and the latter to every element of Aj0 \ Σi0. Moreover, the
A1;:::;Ak are disjoint equivalence classes. Hence, M(Aj \Σi) ¼ M(Aj0 \Σi0) if and only if j = j0.
Therefore, the equivalence classes of W(Σ1) [ ::: [ W(Σn) for the ¼ relation are the sets
Bj = fM(Aj \ Σi) j i 2 f1:::ng;Aj \ Σi 6= ;g
27for j = 1;:::;k. By lemma 5,
M(Bj) = M([fAj \ Σi j i 2 f1:::ng;Aj \ Σi 6= ;g) = M(Aj)
It follows that
W(W(Σ1) [ ::: [ W(Σn)) = fM(B1);:::;M(Bk)g
= fM(A1);:::;M(Ak)g
= W(Σ1 [ ::: [ Σn)
This is the expected result. 2
Lemma 7 Let Σ be a set of states such that err = 2 C(Σ). Then, W(C(Σ)) = W(C(W(Σ))).
Proof: Let Σ1;:::;Σn be a partition of Σ into equivalence classes. By deﬁnition of C, we have
C(Σ) = Σ1 [ ::: [ Σn [ T(Σ1) [ ::: [ T(Σn):
Applying lemma 6, we obtain
W(C(Σ)) = W(W(Σ1) [ ::: [ W(Σn) [ W(T(Σ1)) [ ::: [ W(T(Σn))):
It follows from the hypothesis err = 2 C(Σ) that err = 2 Σi and err = 2 T(Σi) for all i = 1;:::;n. By
lemma 3, we thus have W(T(Σi)) = T(W(Σi)). It follows that
W(C(Σ)) = W(W(Σ1) [ ::: [ W(Σn) [ T(W(Σ1)) [ ::: [ T(W(Σn)))
= W(C(W(Σ1) [ :::W(Σn)))
Since Σ1;:::;Σn is a partition of Σ into equivalence classes, we have W(Σi) = fM(Σi)g and
W(Σ) = fM(Σ1);:::;M(Σn)g = W(Σ1) [ ::: [ W(Σn). The expected result follows. 2
Theorem 2 Let Σc be the smallest set closed under C containing ¾0, and Σw be the smallest set
closed under W ± C containing ¾0. Then, err = 2 Σc implies err = 2 Σw. In other terms, if the
bytecode passes the BC algorithm, it also passes the CFHS algorithm.
Proof: Write Σc =
S
n2N Σn
c and Σw =
S
n2N Σn
w, where Σ0
c = Σ0
w = f¾0g and Σn+1
c = C(Σn
c) and
Σn+1
c = W(C(Σn
c)). Assume that err = 2 Σc. This implies err = 2 Σn
c for any n.
We now show by induction on n that Σn
w = W(Σn
c). The base case n = 0 is trivial, since W
is the identity function on singleton sets. For the inductive case, assume Σn
w = W(Σn
c). Then,
Σn+1
w = W(C(Σn
w)) = W(C(W(Σn
c))). Note that err = 2 C(Σn
c) = Σn+1
c . Applying lemma 7, it
follows that Σn+1
w = W(C(Σn
c)) = W(Σn+1
c ), as desired.
By construction of the widening function W, for any set of states Σ we have err 2 W(Σ) if and
only if err 2 Σ. Thus, for any n, we have err = 2 Σn
w since Σn
w = W(Σn
c) and err = 2 Σn
c. It follows
that err = 2 Σw. 2
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